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We argue that a higher share of the private sector in a country’s external debt raises the 
incentive to stabilize the exchange rate. We present a simple model in which exchange rate 
volatility does not affect agents’ welfare if all the debt is incurred by the government. Once 
we introduce private banks who borrow in foreign currency and lend to domestic firms, the 
monetary authority has an incentive to dampen the distributional consequences of exchange 
rate fluctuations. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that not only the level, but also 
the composition of foreign debt matters for exchange-rate policy. 
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It has long been recognized that, in many developing countries and emerging markets, a large 
volume of external debt denominated in foreign currency generates an incentive to stabilize 
the exchange rate. Hausmann et al. (2001) show that exchange-rate volatility is positively 
correlated to a country’s ability to borrow in its own currency, and  Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
document that even those countries which do not announce an official peg try to avoid 
excessive  exchange rate variations. A large number of studies has subsequently corroborated 
these findings by establishing a strong empirical link between countries’ foreign-currency-
denominated external debt and their tendency to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime. 
In this paper we argue that, while the overall volume of foreign debt certainly matters 
for a country’s exchange-rate regime choice, its composition in terms of the nature of 
borrowers also plays an important role. Specifically, we claim that a higher share of the 
private sector in a country’s total external debt raises the monetary authority’s propensity to 
adopt an explicit or implicit exchange rate target. The logic of our argument runs as follows: 
in the presence of nominal rigidities, any movement of the nominal exchange rate creates 
winners and losers. A nominal depreciation raises the effective debt burden, but also raises 
profits in the domestic export sector. A nominal appreciation has the opposite effect.  If the 
government is the only debtor with respect to the rest of the world it internalizes both gains 
and losses: in case of a depreciation it has to raise higher taxes, but the tax burden is easier to 
bear for exporters who benefit from higher profits. Conversely, an appreciation reduces 
exporters’ profits but the government faces a de-facto lower debt burden. In an extreme case, 
gains and losses from appreciations and depreciations exactly offset each other, and the 
government is indifferent towards fluctuations of the exchange rate. Once a share of foreign 
debt is held by private agents, the argument that aggregate losses from exchange-rate 
volatility are low (or completely absent) no longer holds: domestic debtors loose from a 
depreciation, gain from an appreciation, and unless there is a well-functioning transfer 
scheme, there is no way they participate in exporters’ opposed economic fortunes. Hence, 
moving from public to private external debt drives a wedge between the winners and losers 
from exchange-rate fluctuations, and this generates an incentive to adopt an explicit or 
implicit peg. 
To present this point in a transparent fashion we first develop a simple model which 
relates a monetary authority’s decision to engage in (potentially costly) foreign-exchange 
intervention to the share of the private sector in total foreign debt. We then take the model’s 3 
 
main hypothesis to the data and estimate how the share of private-sector debt in developing 
countries’ total external debt affects the likelihood to adopt a fixed exchange-rate regime. It 
turns out that this effect is significantly positive across a wide range of specifications, samples 
and estimation methods, and that it is even stronger if we explicitly consider the possibility 
that the composition of external debt is endogenous with respect to the exchange-rate regime. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a brief survey of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 introduces our model. In section 4, we present the data we use, 
the specification of our empirical model, and the results from estimating different variations 
of our benchmark specification. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Given the availability of new data sets on de-jure and de-facto exchange rate regimes (Ghosh 
et al. 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff 2004) several recent 
studies have analyzed the empirical determinants of countries’ exchange-rate regimes.
2 Levy-
Yeyati et al. (2004) distinguish an “optimal-currency area view”, a “political-economy view” 
and a “financial view” on exchange-rate regime choice and explore the importance of a wide 
range of potential determinants. They demonstrate that the size of a country’s foreign-
currency denominated liabilities (relative to its money supply) has a strong effect on the 
likelihood of adopting a de-facto peg.
3 Alesina and Wagner (2006) focus on the role of the 
institutional framework and show that while the extent of corruption, the security of property 
rights etc. have no impact on the likelihood of adopting a peg once they control for external 
liabilities, these variables are of crucial importance for the relationship between countries’ 
announcements and their implemented policies. According to their findings, countries with 
bad institutions tend to allow their currencies to be more volatile than would be justified by 
the official exchange rate regime, while countries with good institutions exhibit a Calvo-
Reinhart (2002) style “fear of floating.”  Carmignani et al. (2008) expand the set of political 
and institutional variables and explore how these factors affect countries’ de-jure and de-facto 
exchange-rate regime choices. While the studies just quoted use binary dependent variables – 
mainly dummies representing the prevalence of a de-jure or de-facto peg – von Hagen and 
Zhou (2007) allow for a more differentiated menu of regime choices and perform a 
                                                 
2 Earlier empirical studies on the determinants of countries’ exchange rate regimes are by Rizzo (1998), Poirson 
(2001), Meon and Rizzo (2002), as well as Juhn and Mauro (2002).  A theoretical political-economic analysis of 
exchange-rate-regime choice is provided by Hefeker (1998). 
3 Céspedes et al.  (2004) provide a theoretical justification by highlighting  “balance sheet effects” as a channel  
through which a flexible exchange rate  amplifies the consequences of economic shocks.  4 
 
multinomial logit analysis. They find that exchange rate regimes exhibit a high degree of 
persistence and that various factors affect regime choice in a non-linear fashion, making a 
multinomial logit preferable to an ordered logit approach.  
The paper closest to our analysis is Faia et al. (2008) who describe a conflict of 
interest between the financial sector and exporting firms. While the latter benefit from the 
increase in price competitiveness resulting from a nominal depreciation, the financial sector is 
hurt by the increasing value of foreign-currency denominated debt. The authors focus on the 
political process that brings about the choice of a certain exchange-rate regime and 
demonstrate that a stronger influence of the respective lobbies results in greater de-facto 
exchange-rate stability – especially in a “bad” institutional environment that makes the 
government more amenable to the pressure of interest groups. While the central argument of 
our paper is also based on the distributional effects of exchange rate fluctuations, our analysis 
substantially differs from Faia et al. (2008) by concentrating on the composition of external 
debt and by emphasizing the distinct roles of private and public liabilities. This difference is 
also at the heart of our empirical analysis, and the share of the private sector in a country’s 
total external debt is the key regressor in our investigation.
4  
 
3. A Simple Model of Private Foreign Debt and Exchange Rate Stabilization 
 
3.1. Basic Structure and Assumptions 
 
We consider a small open economy that consists of a monetary authority and a population 
whose total mass is normalized to one. Agents live for one period, receive an exogenous non-
market income  X  and a market income Y , which can either be derived from entrepreneurial 
activity or from financial intermediation.
5 There are n financial intermediaries (“banks”) who 
borrow abroad and lend to domestic entrepreneurs, and (1- n )  “entrepreneurs” who use the 
borrowed resources to produce a homogenous good whose price is normalized to one. In what 
follows, we assume that  1 0   n and we denote a bank’s (entrepreneur’s) market income by 
B Y  ( 
E Y  ). At the end of their lives, agents consume their entire income, which yields utility 
) ln(
k Y X U    , with   E B k ,   . 
                                                 
4 By contrast, Faia et al. (2008) multiply the size of the financial sector (relative to GDP) with a country’s 
foreign-currency-denominated liabilities. 
5  Given that agents’ market income is subject to fluctuations, their non-market income prevents consumption 
from turning negative. 5 
 
The country’s total external borrowing at the beginning of the period (D) is measured in 
foreign currency units and normalized to one. By assumption, each bank borrows one unit, 
hence total private external debt equals  n D
P   and total public external debt is given by 
n D
G  1 . Both banks and the government borrow at a gross foreign interest rate R* which 
is normalized to one for simplicity. While banks lend the borrowed funds to entrepreneurs at a 
gross interest rate R (repayable in domestic currency units), the government uses these funds 
to finance a public infrastructure. At the end of the period, banks and government have to 
repay their foreign liabilities whose value in domestic currency units is then determined by 
the nominal exchange rate S (in price notation). The government meets its repayment 
obligations by raising taxes T  from entrepreneurs, while banks use the principal and interest 
received from domestic entrepreneurs. Note that a nominal depreciation increases the end-of-
period debt burden for both banks and government, and that 
G D S T   . Hence, the tax paid 
by entrepreneur i is   n D S T
G
i    1 /.  
Banks’ total foreign borrowing (
P D ) is allocated uniformly among domestic 
entrepreneurs, hence an individual entrepreneur borrows the amount   n D
P  1 /.  T h e  i n c o m e  
of entrepreneur i before taxes and before debt repayment increases in the amount borrowed 
from banks, in the size of the public infrastructure, and in the nominal exchange rate. More 
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Private debt (
P D  ) has a positive influence on 
E
i Y  since entrepreneurs use the borrowed funds 
to finance investment. The positive effect of 
G D  on 
E
i Y  can be rationalized by the assumption 
that a publicly financed infrastructure raises firms’ productivity. Linearity is assumed for 
simplicity. Finally, the fact that a nominal depreciation raises 
E
i Y  while a nominal 
appreciation reduces 
E
i Y  follows from exporters’ “pricing to market” behavior:  if firms  fix 
their prices in foreign-currency terms before the nominal exchange rate is realized and if their 
costs are not affected by exchange rate fluctuations, a depreciation increases profits in 
domestic currency units.  
The market income of bank j is given by the difference between (domestic currency) 




j    (2) 
 
As we will see below, none of our results depends on the value of the domestic interest rate R. 
While we could easily endogenize this variable by assuming a particular market structure in 
the financial sector and by computing the equilibrium price of domestic loans, this would add 
no important insights. For the sake of simplicity we therefore treat R like an exogenous 
variable. 
At the end of the period, there is an exogenous shock S
~
 to the nominal exchange rate, 
which the monetary authority may fight by intervening in foreign-exchange markets. 
Intervention comes at a cost   which depends on the difference between the shock and the 
exchange rate the monetary authority implements. More specifically,  
2 ~
2
S S  

  with   ≥ 
0. Once S
~
 is realized, the monetary authority chooses S to maximize the following objective 
function:  
 
      
2 ~
2





G        

   (3) 
 
3.2. Private Foreign Debt and Exchange-Rate Volatility 
 
Using (1) and the fact that    n D S T
G
i    1 /  it is easy to show that citizens’ end-of-period 
consumption is unaffected by exchange rate fluctuations if n = 0, i.e. if all foreign borrowing 
is done by the government. This is due to the fact that both their gross income and their tax 
burden increases in 
G D S  . Hence, while a nominal depreciation benefits entrepreneurs by 
generating higher incomes before taxes, it hurts them by raising the taxes they have to pay.  A 
nominal appreciation produces the opposite effect. This result is clearly owed to the simple 
structure of our model, but it conveys a more general message: the government’s higher debt 
burden resulting from a depreciation is passed on to citizens in the form of higher taxes. If the 
same citizens benefit from a depreciation due to higher gross incomes, the impact of 
exchange-rate fluctuations on welfare is dampened. In the extreme case of our model, gains 
and losses cancel out, and the government has no incentive to intervene in foreign-exchange 
markets.  7 
 
If n > 0, i.e. if there are both bankers and entrepreneurs, average end-of-period consumption 
C  is still unaffected by the exchange rate, i.e. 
 




j        1  (4) 
 
Hence, in our model exchange rate fluctuations are purely redistributive: while a nominal 
depreciation increases entrepreneurs’ income (before and after taxes), it reduces the income of 
banks, with both changes exactly offsetting each other.  
To analyze how the monetary authority’s optimal choice of the exchange rate (
 S ) for 
a given shock S
~
 is affected by the presence of private foreign borrowing, we substitute (1) 
and (2) into (3), bearing in mind that    n D S T
G
i    1 / , and set the derivative with respect to 
S equal to zero. This yields the following expression: 
 
   R S n R S   
 ~
 , (5) 
 
















j T Y X Y X  
 
Assuming that bankers’ and entrepreneurs’ consumption never turns negative, i.e.  0    in 
all states of nature, we have   1 0   n   for all    1 , 0  n . Let’s start by considering three 
special cases: if  =0, i.e. if foreign exchange market intervention is costless, the monetary 
authority chooses to perfectly stabilize the exchange rate, and  R S 
 . Conversely, if these 
costs are close to infinity, the monetary authority allows the exchange rate to be determined 
by the exogenous shock, i.e.  S S
~





  as well. This is just the result outlined at the start of this subsection: agents’   
consumption is unaffected by exchange rate fluctuations in this case, and the monetary 
authority has no incentive to influence the exchange rate.  
If, however, the costs of stabilization are strictly positive and n > 0, the monetary 
authority chooses to stabilize the exchange rate to some extent: since   1 0   n  , deviations 
of S*  from R are smaller than deviations of S
~
 from R. In fact, using (1) and (2) it can be 8 
 
shown that   0   n  : an increasing number of banks – i.e. an increasing share of the private 
sector in total external debt – raises the government’s incentive to stabilize the exchange rate. 
The logic behind this result is straightforward: while average consumption is unaffected by 
the public vs. private decomposition of foreign debt, a strictly positive number of banks 
reflects the existence of a group of agents who definitely lose from a depreciation. 
Conversely, entrepreneurs unambiguously gain from the domestic currency’s loss in value, 
and the opposite holds for an appreciation. Since the government maximizes the sum of all 
agents’ utilities and since utility functions are concave it decides to completely stabilize the 
exchange rate if this is costless. If the costs of foreign exchange intervention are strictly 
positive the government faces a tradeoff, but unless  is infinite it avoids excessive 
fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
 
4. Private Sector Debt and the Choice of an Exchange Rate Regime: An Empirical 
Exploration 
 
4.1. Model Specification 
 
The simple model of the preceding section suggests that an increasing share of the private 
sector in total external debt ceteris paribus raises the likelihood that  a country stabilizes its 




     
K
k
it t it k k it it x PRIVSHARE Peg
1
, 1 1 0       (6) 
 
In equation (6),  it Peg  is a dummy variable which is one if country i adopted a peg in period t, 
and zero otherwise.  1  it PRIVSHARE  is the share of the private sector in country i’s total long-
term external debt at the end of period t-1. According to our model, the coefficient  1   should 
be strictly positive. By using the lagged value of PRIVSHARE we are trying to mitigate the 
problem that private-sector debt in period t might be affected by the exchange rate regime. 
We will later account for the possible endogeneity of our key regressor by using instrumental 
variable estimation. 
The variables  it k x ,  are control variables, some of which are lagged by one period,  t   is 
a time-dummy, and  it   the error term. It is quite likely that the variance of  it   differs 9 
 
systematically across countries and that the error term exhibits a high degree of persistence. 
We therefore put as little restrictions as possible on the joint distribution of  it  , and all 
standard errors are based on a robust covariance matrix which allows for heteroscedasticity 
and arbitrary serial correlation within clusters.
6  
We will first estimate equation (6) by OLS. While this “linear probability model” has 
the unattractive property that the fitted values of the dependent variable – interpreted as the 
probability that a country chooses a peg – do not necessarily fall into the interval between 
zero and one, it offers the advantage of not depending on a particular assumption about the 
distribution of the error term. As an alternative, we will later estimate a probit regression 
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K
k
it t it k k it it x PRIVSHARE Peg
1
, 1 1 0       (7a) 
    0 1  

it it Peg Peg  (7b) 
 






Our data set consists of annual data for developing countries and emerging markets which are 
covered by the World Bank’s Global Development Finance.
7 We are considering the time 
span from 1975 through 2004, and we ignore high-income countries  as well as observations 
for countries whose population was smaller than one million in the year 2000. Our key 
regressor  PRIVSHARE(-1) is computed by dividing countries’ long-term external debt of the 
private sector in period t-1 by the sum of private and public long-term external debt.
8 
We are using three types of control variables: a wide array of dummy variables is 
meant to capture the influence of regional characteristics (Europe and Central Asia, 
                                                 
6 Our decision to account for cluster-specific serial correlation deserves to be highlighted: if we use a mere 
“heteroscedasticity-robust” covariance matrix, standard errors are much lower and t-statistics much higher across 
the board. 
7 Information on the exact definition and sources of data is given in the data appendix. 
8 Long-term debt covers debt with a maturity of at least one year. We do not consider short-term debt since the 
private/public disaggregation is not available for debt with a lower maturity. 10 
 
Subsaharan Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America), colonial heritage 
(BRITISH, FRENCH) as well as the potential for and composition of foreign trade 
(LANDLOCK, FUELS, PRIMARY MATERIALS).  
The second set of control variables captures factors which potentially vary over time, 
but which are unlikely to be endogenous with respect to the exchange rate regime. We 
therefore include them without a time lag. Specifically, we use the logarithm of countries’ 
population size (POPULATION) and the average of the Freedom House measures of political 
rights and civil liberties (REPRESS).
9  Our inclusion of these regressors is based on the 
notion that larger countries have a smaller incentive to enhance trade by pegging the exchange 
rate, and that more repressive regimes often control foreign exchange transactions by 
imposing a fixed exchange rate.  
The third set of regressors consists of variables which are potentially affected by the 
exchange rate regime and which are therefore lagged by one period. The regressor 
FORLIAB(-1) represents a country’s total foreign liabilities relative to its money supply in 
period t-1. This variable, which does not distinguish between private and public debt, figures 
prominently in many recent analyses of exchange-rate regime choice (see, e.g. Levy-Yeyati et 
al. 2004) and it captures the potential “balance-sheet-effects” of exchange rate fluctuations. 
We therefore expect it to have a positive impact on the likelihood that a country chooses a 
peg.
10 The variable GAP_USA(-1) reflects a country’s per-capita GDP relative to the USA. 
While we do not have a clear hypothesis on the effect of relative prosperity, this variable is 
possibly correlated with private-sector borrowing on international capital markets and needs 
to be included to avoid omitted variable bias. Similarly, a sequence of budget deficits is likely 
to affect both the share of the private sector in total external debt and the viability of a fixed 
exchange-rate regime. We therefore include the average of the central government’s budget 
balance during the preceding three years (BUDGET_3Y(-1)) as an additional regressor. 
Finally, we use the measure of openness to international trade in assets (KAOPEN(-1)) 
developed by Chinn and Ito (2008) to capture the notion that unrestricted capital flows are 




                                                 
9 Both Freedom House measures are defined on a scale between one and seven, with a value of seven indicating 
maximal repression. 
10 Surprisingly, the correlation between PRIVSHARE(-1) and FORLIAB(-1) is close to zero and statistically not 
significant. 11 
 
4.2.2. Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
While earlier empirical research on the determinants and consequences of exchange rate 
regimes had to rely on countries’ official announcements, the more recent contributions 
quoted in Section 2 use a number of “de-facto” exchange-rate regime classifications which 
have been developed to reflect the extent of exchange-rate stability that is actually 
implemented by monetary authorities. In this paper, we will use three different classifications: 
apart from the de-jure classification compiled by the IMF in its “Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions” (for a detailed description see Ghosh et al., 2002) 
we consider the de-facto classification developed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) as 
well as the “natural classification” of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
As described in Tavlas et al. (2008) as well as Harms and Kretschmann (2009), the 
three classifications have their own interpretations, merits and shortcomings: the de-facto 
classification of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003, henceforth LYS)  takes into account 
both the volatility of the exchange rate, of exchange rate growth,  and of a country’s foreign-
exchange reserves. A peg is identified as a combination of low exchange-rate fluctuations and 
volatile reserves. By contrast, the “natural classification” of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, 
henceforth RR) centers its attention to the observed stability of the exchange rate. However, it 
differs from LYS by focusing on movements of the parallel exchange rate. A peculiarity of 
the “natural classification” is its assignment of episodes with an inflation rate above 40 
percent to a separate “freely-falling” category. As we argue in Harms and Kretschmann 
(2009), this approach may  distort the picture if one considers the macroeconomic effects of 
different exchange-rate regimes. However, in the present context, it is unlikely to be 
important since the fraction of freely-falling episodes that would be classified as pegs is tiny. 
We therefore use the data from the original “natural classification” of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004).
11  It is not obvious which of the three regime classifications most closely represents 
the forces described by the model of Section 3. It could be argued that the combination of low 
exchange-rate fluctuations and high reserves volatility as captured by the LYS classification 
reflects the active and deliberate stabilization of the exchange rate by a country’s monetary 
authority. However, the LYS methodology’s focus on the official exchange rate clearly comes 
as a disadvantage. Moreover, a de-facto stable rate may also be implemented through a 
consistent monetary policy – that is, even if the monetary authority does not intervene in 
                                                 
11 The dataset originally compiled by Calvo and Reinhart (2004) covers the years through 2001. Following the 
principles of the “natural classification” Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006) have recently computed de-facto 
exchange-rate regimes up to the year 2004. For our analysis we have merged the two datasets.  12 
 
foreign-exchange markets it may adjust its policy to the implicit goal of stabilizing the 
exchange rate. Finally, it would be wrong to dismiss a country’s official regime as mere cheap 
talk: announcing a peg raises the costs of allowing the exchange rate to float, and we should 
thus interpret such an announcement as a sign that a country intends to keep the exchange rate 
stable.
12 Based on these arguments we will use all three classifications in the subsequent 
empirical analysis.  
 
4.2.3. Accounting for Currency Crises 
 
The model of section 2 is meant to describe “business as usual” in foreign exchange markets: 
it is not the appropriate framework to characterize behavior during a currency crisis – in 
particular, since exchange-rate movements during such episodes are likely to be beyond the 
monetary authority’s control. We therefore limit our attention to periods in which no currency 
crisis took place. To identify currency crises we use the criteria established by Frankel and 
Rose (1996:352) – namely “a nominal depreciation of the currency [against the US dollar] of 
at least 25 % that is also at least a 10 % increase in the rate of depreciation.” In subsequent 





4.3.1. OLS and Probit Estimation 
 
The first three columns of Table 1 present the results of estimating equation (6) by OLS. The 
columns refer to a de-jure peg, a peg according to LYS, and a peg according to RR, 
respectively. Most of the control variables have the expected sign. In particular – and in 
accordance with the existing literature – FORLIAB(-1) has a significantly positive influence 
on the likelihood of adopting a peg. Moreover, the coefficient of the budget balance is 
significantly positive while the negative coefficient of POPULATION indicates that, ceteris 
paribus, larger countries have a smaller incentive to stabilize the exchange rate. Our main 
variable of interest PRIVSHARE(-1) has a significantly positive coefficient: raising the share 
                                                 
12 Note, however, that this view is not uncontested: Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and, more recently, Alesina and 
Wagner (2006)  argue that monetary authorities in many emerging markets stabilize the exchange rate, but avoid 
to announce a peg to reduce the risk of speculative attacks. 13 
 
of the private sector in a country’s external debt by one percent point increases the likelihood 
of a peg by approximately half a percentage point. 
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 1 provide the results of estimating equation (7) using 
probit. For all three classifications, the main findings of the linear probability model are 
confirmed: PRIVSHARE(-1) has a significantly positive influence, and the marginal effects 
evaluated at the mean are not too different from the corresponding values of the first three 
columns. 
 
4.3.2. Instrumental Variable Estimation 
 
While our simple model assumed the share of the private sector in total foreign borrowing  to 
be exogenous, we have to pay attention to the potential endogeneity of this variable when 
taking the model’s implications to the data.  It is quite plausible that private foreign borrowing 
is affected by the exchange rate regime: if external debt is denominated in a foreign currency, 
the anticipation of a stable exchange rate may lure domestic financial institutions into 
increasing their exposure to international capital markets.
13 Using lagged regressors somewhat 
mitigates this problem, but our estimates may still be biased – especially since PRIVSHARE(-
1) represents the share of private-sector debt at the end of period t-1. 
To account for potential endogeneity we start by estimating the linear probability 
model (LPM) of equation (6) using GMM.
14 The instruments we use are the average quality 
of financial-sector regulation in the preceding three years as measured by the Fraser Institute 
(various issues) (CREDREG_3Y(-1)), the average inflation rate of the preceding years 
(INFLA_3Y(-1)) as well as the growth rate of real per-capita income in the preceding three 
years (GROWTH_3Y(-1)).
15  We argue that a less regulated financial sector encourages 
private foreign borrowing while low inflation rates and high economic growth characterize a 
stable macroeconomic environment which is conducive to higher private foreign debt. To 
document that these regressors are indeed relevant, i.e. correlated with PRIVSHARE(-1), we 
report the p-value referring to the Kleinbergen-Paap rk-statistic for underidentification. The 
joint exogeneity of our instruments is checked by running Hansen’s (1982) J-test. Finally, we 
                                                 
13 In fact, regressing PRIVSHARE(-1) on a dummy representing a fixed exchange rate regime yields a very high 
and statistically significant coefficient. 
14 In the presence of heteroscedasticity , GMM estimation is superior to standard IV estimation since  it uses an 
endogenous weighting matrix when combining the different moment conditions.  To implement this estimator 
we applied the ivreg2 module for Stata designed and described by Baum et al. (2007). 
15 To limit the influence of extremely high inflation rates without losing observations, INFLA_3Y(-1) is based 
on „transformed inflation rates“  
trans = /(1+). 14 
 
compute the p-value referring to the null-hypothesis that PRIVSHARE(-1) is exogenous.
  We 
also tested the exogeneity of individual instruments by performing a series of C-(“differenc-
in-Sargan”) tests. The results of these tests are available upon request.
16 
The first three columns of Table 2 indicate that PRIVSHARE(-1) has a positive 
influence on the likelihood of a peg even if we explicitly account for this regressor’s potential 
endogeneity. Except for the LYS classification, we can reject the null-hypothesis of 
exogeneity at the 10-percent level, and the diagnostics of instrument relevance and exogeneity 
do not send clear warning signals. The coefficient of PRIVSHARE(-1) increases relative to 
the values displayed in Table 1: an increase of the private-sector share by one percentage-
point raises the likelihood of a peg by approximately two percent. This is surprising since we 
would have expected OLS to over-estimate the impact of PRIVSHARE(-1). Still, our finding 
is not totally implausible: if exchange rate stability has a positive and very strong impact on 
private foreign borrowing, this may result in a downward bias of the OLS estimator. 
Columns (4) to (6) present the results of applying Newey’s (1987) “minimum-
distance” estimator to the probit specification of our empirical model.
17 All coefficients 
reported are marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the regressors. Comparing these results 
to the first three columns, we find that the coefficient of PRIVSHARE(-1) is still positive and 
increases for all three exchange-rate classifications, but it is not significant for LYS. 
However, in this case we cannot reject the hypothesis that PRIVSHARE(-1) is exogenous. 
Although a test for exogeneity of the excluded instruments (Lee, 1992) does not indicate any 
obvious problems, the dramatic increase of the marginal effects against the linear-probability 
model is somewhat suspicious. This may be due to the “fairly strong assumptions” 
(Wooldridge 2002:472) which have to be satisfied in order to estimate a probit model with an 
endogenous regressor. In particular, the requirement that PRIVSHARE(-1) should have the 
features of a normal random variable is unlikely to be satisfied, given that this variable is 
never negative and equal to zero for many observations.  We therefore do not take the 
marginal effects too seriously but take away as a result that instrumental-variable probit 





                                                 
16 See Baum et al. (2007) for details. 
17 To implement this estimator we used the ivprobit module programmed for Stata. Overidentification 
restrictions were tested using the overid module programmed by Baum et al. (2006). 15 
 
4.3.3. Sample Variations 
 
The following estimates expose our benchmark results to several variations of the sample. In 
doing so, we limit our attention to the linear probability model, which we estimate both by 
OLS and by GMM using the instrumental variables described above.  
Table 3 checks whether our results are driven by the early post-Bretton-Woods phase 
and limits its focus to observations after 1985 – the year which Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007) identify as the starting point of the recent era of “financial globalization”. For the de-
jure and the LYS classification, this considerable reduction of sample size barely affects the 
significance level and coefficient of PRIVSHARE(-1). For the RR classification, the 
coefficient drops more noticeably, and the results for the GMM-regression in column (6) 
indicate that it is no longer significant. Note, however, that in this case, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that PRIVSHARE(-1) is exogenous. We therefore give a greater weight to the 
OLS results in columns (1) - (3) and conclude that the private-sector share has a positive 
influence on the decision to peg for all three regime classifications, even if we only consider 
the more recent  observations. 
We also explored the consequences of omitting “freely-falling” episodes – i.e. 
observations that were characterized by an annual inflation rate of at least 40 percent (see 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). Table 4 indicates that this sample variation reduces the 
coefficient of PRIVSHARE(-1) for the de-jure classification while it barely affects it for LYS 
and RR. With OLS estimation, the t-statistics drop below the critical values  for the ten-
percent level of significance in columns (1) and (2).
18 However, if we account for the 
potential endogeneity of private borrowing, PRIVSHARE(-1) is siginificant for all three 
classifications.  
In Table 5, we report the results from estimating equation (6) without omitting 
currency-crisis episodes. This barely changes the coefficients and the associated levels of 
significance for the de-jure and the RR classifications. By contrast the share of the private 
sector in total external debt does not seem to have a significant influence on the likelihood to 
adopt a peg according to the LYS classification, and this holds both for OLS and for GMM 
estimation. To interpret the finding that PRIVSHARE(-1) is no longer a significant 
determinant of LYS-pegs once currency-crisis episodes are included  we need to recall the 
essential features of the LYS classification: a peg is characterized by a combination of a stable 
official exchange rate and volatile foreign-exchange reserves. By definition, the exchange rate 
                                                 
18 In both cases, the associated p-values are 11 percent. 16 
 
is not stable during a currency crisis. Hence, in the regressions that are based on the larger 
sample, the share of pegs according to the LYS classification should be smaller.
19  I f    
currency crises are more frequent with a high private-sector exposure, this may weaken the 
link between PRIVSHARE(-1) and the choice  of LYS pegs and thus explain the results in 
Table 5. We conclude that our benchmark results are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of 
“non-standard” situations if a peg is defined according to the criteria of LYS. By contrast, the 
influence of PRIVSHARE(-1) on de-jure pegs and pegs according to the RR classification are 
not affected by these sample variations. In any case the positive relationship between 
PRIVSHARE(-1) and the likelihood to peg remains valid. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The key hypothesis brought forward in this paper is that not only the volume of external 
liabilities, but also its composition matters for a country’s incentive to stabilize the exchange 
rate. We argue that a higher share of the private sector in total external debt drives a wedge 
between winners and losers from exchange-rate fluctuations. Absent another compensation 
mechanism, this raises the political attractiveness of adopting a peg. 
Taking this hypothesis to the data we distinguish between three exchange-rate 
classifications: a de-jure classification which identifies pegs according to countries’ 
announcements, the de-facto classification of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) which 
defines a peg as a combination of stable exchange rates and volatile reserves, and the “natural 
classification” of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) which focuses on the stability of the “relevant” 
– possibly parallel – exchange rate. Our empirical results suggest that, indeed, a higher share 
of the private sector in total external debt raises the likelihood of observing a peg in emerging 
markets and developing countries. This finding holds across a range of specifications and 
estimation techniques, and it comes out even stronger if we account for the potential 
endogeneity of private-sector debt. The result is also robust against various modifications of 
the sample – at least when the de-jure and the “natural” classifications are used. In case of the 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classification, the low t-statistics we observe when including 
currency crises may be explained by referring to the principles according to which pegs are 
identified in this particular exchange rate classification. 
We consider our results as a further step towards a better understanding of the political 
economy of exchange-rate regime choice. For many developing countries and emerging 
                                                 
19 Indeed, the share of LYS-pegs in our sample decreases from 0.57 to 0.55 once we include currency crises. 17 
 
markets, the share of the private sector in total external borrowing has increased substantially 
in the recent past (Celasun and Harms, 2009). While such an increase in a given country may 
be explained by the monetary authority’s decision to adopt an explicit or implicit peg, our 
results suggest that it also raises the incentive to stabilize the exchange rate. Whether such a 
circle of low exchange-rate volatility and large private foreign borrowing is vicious or 
virtuous is beyond the scope of this paper, but provides an interesting topic for future 
research. 
 
6. Data appendix 
 
The data consists of annual observations for 167 developing countries and emerging markets 
for the years 1975 to 2004. The dependent variable is a dummy which is one if a peg is 
observed according to one of the following classifications: 
 
De-jure : Dummy variable which equals one if exchange rate regime belongs to one of the 
following categories: dollarization, currency board, currency union, single currency peg, 
published basket peg, and secret basket peg. Source:  Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) and IMF 
(various issues). 
LYS: Dummy variable which equals one if exchange rate regime is a peg according to the 
classification of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). 
RR: Dummy variable which equals one if exchange rate regime is a peg according to the 
“natural classification” of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). Data for the years 2002 – 2004 are 
taken from Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006). 
BUDGET_3Y(-1): Lagged three-year average of the central government’s budget balance 
(relative to GDP). Source: International Monetary Fund  (World Economic Outlook Database) 
CREDREG_3Y(-1): Lagged three-year average of the Fraser Institute's index of credit 
market regulation, ranging from 0 (minimal regulation) to 10 (maximal regulation). Source: 
Fraser Institute (various issues). 
FORLIAB(-1): Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money. Source: International Monetary Fund  
(International Financial Statistics),  line 26C/ (line 14 + line 24). 
GAP_USA(-1): Per capita GDP in constant international dollars, expressed relative to the 
United State (US=100) in the same year. Source: Heston et al. 2006  (Penn World Tables 6.2). 
GROWTH_3Y(-1): Lagged three-year average of the growth rate of real  per-capita income. 
Source: Heston et al. 2006  (Penn World Tables 6.2). 18 
 
INFLA_3Y(-1): Lagged three-year average of the transformed growth rate of the consumer 
price index . The transformation is 
trans = /(1+). Source: World Bank (World 
Development Indicators). 
KAOPEN(-1): Lagged value of the Chinn/Ito measure of capital-account openness. Source: 
Chinn and Ito (2008). 
POPULATION: Natural logarithm of the population (in thousands). Source: Heston et al. 
2006 (Penn World Tables 6.2). 
PRIV SHARE(-1): Lagged share of private nonguaranteed long-term external debt in 
total long-term external debt (in percent). Source: World Bank (Global Development 
Finance). 
REPRESS: Average of the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties, 
ranging from 1 (maximal rights) to 7 (minimal rights). Source: Freedom House (various 
issues). 
Dummy variables:  
LANDLOCK (landlocked countries), BRITISH (British legal system), FRENCH (French 
legal system), FUELS (Exporter of fuels), PRIMARY_MAT (Exporter of primary materials 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peg (De‐jure) Peg (LYS) Peg (RR) Peg (De‐jure) Peg (LYS) Peg (RR)
OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit
PRIVSHARE(‐1) 0.416** 0.369* 0.580** 1.324* 1.245* 2.012***
[0.197] [0.208] [0.229] [0.686] [0.664] [0.761]
FORLIAB(‐1) 0.008*** 0.037*** 0.008*** 0.190** 0.164** 0.173*
[0.002] [0.008] [0.002] [0.076] [0.078] [0.099]
BUDGET_3y(‐1) 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.015** 3.876** 0.807 1.116
[0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [1.759] [1.539] [1.698]
GAP_USA(‐1) 0.001 ‐0.005 ‐0.004 0.001 ‐0.018 ‐0.013
[0.005] [0.004] [0.008] [0.017] [0.014] [0.023]
POPULATION ‐0.091*** ‐0.070*** ‐0.034 ‐0.321*** ‐0.253*** ‐0.104
[0.025] [0.023] [0.034] [0.094] [0.080] [0.109]
KAOPEN(‐1) 0.001 0.03 0.079*** 0.002 0.106* 0.241***
[0.023] [0.021] [0.028] [0.076] [0.065] [0.089]
LANDLOCK 0.119* 0.091 0.073 0.415 0.301 0.262
[0.068] [0.064] [0.105] [0.257] [0.248] [0.346]
REPRESS 0.002 0.007 0.025 0.029 0.046 0.092
[0.020] [0.020] [0.024] [0.063] [0.066] [0.081]
BRITISH ‐0.273 ‐0.358 ‐0.465** ‐1.016 ‐1.273 ‐1.604*
[0.205] [0.272] [0.233] [0.780] [0.959] [0.900]
FRENCH ‐0.106 ‐0.232 ‐0.121 ‐0.47 ‐0.813 ‐0.605
[0.200] [0.263] [0.208] [0.782] [0.947] [0.851]
FUELS 0.117 0.205** ‐0.113 0.482 0.717** ‐0.469
[0.100] [0.097] [0.114] [0.377] [0.331] [0.466]
PRIMARY_MAT ‐0.008 0.01 ‐0.211** 0.034 0.02 ‐0.675**
[0.064] [0.066] [0.094] [0.248] [0.227] [0.338]
E. Asia /Pacific ‐0.217 ‐0.207 ‐0.033 ‐0.87 ‐0.561 ‐0.194
[0.181] [0.137] [0.214] [0.650] [0.427] [0.717]
Europe/C. Asia ‐0.462** ‐0.537** ‐0.247 ‐1.689** ‐1.784** ‐1.206
[0.189] [0.214] [0.209] [0.839] [0.894] [1.026]
South Asia 0.141 ‐0.263* 0.314 0.48 ‐0.79 0.915
[0.236] [0.152] [0.194] [0.762] [0.517] [0.631]
Subsah. Africa ‐0.012 0.039 0.451*** ‐0.102 0.175 1.340**
[0.113] [0.124] [0.157] [0.414] [0.401] [0.536]
Latin America ‐0.403*** ‐0.305*** 0.003 ‐1.520*** ‐0.887** ‐0.08
[0.100] [0.113] [0.135] [0.401] [0.371] [0.489]
Constant 1.780*** 1.795*** 0.701 4.759*** 4.546*** 1.226
[0.370] [0.346] [0.437] [1.434] [1.338] [1.577]
Marginal effect 0.515* 0.484* 0.745***
Adj. Rsquared 0.36 0.3 0.31 0.33 0.26 0.27
Obs. 1831 1591 1590 1831 1591 1590  22 
 
 
Notes on Table 1: Standard errors in parentheses are based on a robust covariance matrix that accounts for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within clusters. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 
percent.  All regressions include time dummies whose coefficients are not displayed, but are available upon 
request. The R




( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Peg (De‐jure) Peg (LYS) Peg (RR) Peg (De‐jure) Peg (LYS) Peg (RR)
GMM‐LPM GMM‐LPM GMM‐LPM IV‐Probit IV‐Probit IV‐Probit
PRIVSHARE(‐1) 2.313** 1.383* 1.882** 5.746*** 2.059 9.585***
[0.985] [0.802] [0.954] [1.782] [1.681] [2.289]
FORLIAB(‐1) 0.010*** 0.039*** 0.011*** 0.246*** 0.199** 0.376***
[0.002] [0.009] [0.003] [0.075] [0.079] [0.124]
BUDGET_3y(‐1) 0.040*** 0.029*** 0.014** 4.106*** 1.476 1.140
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [1.127] [1.065] [1.095]
GAP_USA(‐1) ‐0.016* ‐0.017** ‐0.016 ‐0.034*** ‐0.032*** ‐0.081***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.017]
POPULATION ‐0.173*** ‐0.112*** ‐0.093** ‐0.536*** ‐0.335*** ‐0.418***
[0.037] [0.027] [0.046] [0.052] [0.051] [0.070]
KAOPEN(‐1) 0.022 0.047* 0.077*** 0.037 0.112*** 0.274***
[0.029] [0.025] [0.028] [0.041] [0.039] [0.048]
LANDLOCK 0.186** 0.076 ‐0.039 0.526*** 0.218 ‐0.027
[0.092] [0.091] [0.097] [0.150] [0.140] [0.163]
REPRESS 0.015 0.006 0.046* 0.094** 0.053 0.150***
[0.025] [0.026] [0.025] [0.037] [0.036] [0.042]
BRITISH ‐0.552** ‐0.502 ‐0.734** ‐2.760*** ‐2.433*** ‐7.594***
[0.267] [0.316] [0.322] [0.605] [0.545] [0.648]
FRENCH ‐0.331 ‐0.354 ‐0.325 ‐2.108*** ‐1.941*** ‐6.348***
[0.259] [0.305] [0.313] [0.601] [0.538] [0.625]
FUELS 0.216 0.313*** 0.056 0.800*** 0.920*** 0.365
[0.132] [0.114] [0.142] [0.188] [0.176] [0.260]
PRIMARY_MAT ‐0.189 ‐0.065 ‐0.157 ‐0.298** 0.052 ‐0.606***
[0.118] [0.098] [0.132] [0.144] [0.134] [0.162]
Constant 2.515*** 1.956*** 1.321** 9.365*** 6.019*** 10.292***
[0.443] [0.378] [0.548] [0.967] [0.801] [0.738]
Adj. Rsquared 0.19 0.24 0.26
Exogeneity of excl. instruments (p‐value) 0.41 0.35 0.63 0.37 0.48 0.22
Exogeneity of PRIVSHARE(‐1) (p‐value) 0.031 0.110 0.064 0.008 0.468 0.000
Underidentification (p‐value) 0.005 0.002 0.015
Obs. 1477 1308 1314 1478 1309 1315  
 
 
Notes on Table 2: Standard errors in parentheses are based on a robust covariance matrix that accounts for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within clusters. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 
percent.  All regressions include regional and time dummies whose coefficients are not displayed, but are 
available upon request.  Columns (1) – (3) are based on the GMM estimation of a linear probability model while 
columns (4) – (6) are based on Newey’s (1987) two-step estimator as described in Wooldridge (2002:472 ff.). 
The instruments used in the regressions underlying columns (1) – (3) and (6) are CREDREG_3Y(-1), 23 
 
INFLA_3Y(-1) as well as GROWTH_3Y(-1). For columns (4) and (5) only CREDREG_3Y(-1) and 
GROWTH_3Y(-1) were used as instruments. To test for the exogeneity of the excluded instruments, columns (1) 
– (3) refer to the p-value associated with Hansen’s (1982) J-statistic while columns (4) – (6) refer to the 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum 
2-statistic. The exogeneity of PRIVSHARE(-1) is tested using a C-(difference-
in-Sargan) test in columns (1) – (3) while columns (4) – (6) refer to the exogeneity test as described in 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peg (De‐jure) Peg (LYS) Peg (RR) Peg (De‐jure) Peg (LYS) Peg (RR)
OLS OLS OLS GMM‐LPM GMM‐LPM GMM‐LPM
PRIVSHARE(‐1) 0.421* 0.386* 0.470* 2.291** 1.444** 1.106
[0.230] [0.216] [0.259] [1.000] [0.734] [0.816]
FORLIAB(‐1) 0.018*** 0.043*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.042*** 0.022***
[0.003] [0.008] [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.004]
BUDGET_3y(‐1) 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.016** 0.038*** 0.025*** 0.014*
[0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.007]
GAP_USA(‐1) 0 ‐0.006 ‐0.003 ‐0.019* ‐0.019*** ‐0.01
[0.006] [0.005] [0.009] [0.010] [0.007] [0.011]
POPULATION ‐0.078*** ‐0.052* ‐0.03 ‐0.157*** ‐0.089*** ‐0.071
[0.027] [0.026] [0.037] [0.039] [0.028] [0.047]
KAOPEN(‐1) ‐0.001 0.041* 0.046 0.017 0.063** 0.042
[0.025] [0.023] [0.029] [0.028] [0.025] [0.028]
LANDLOCK 0.150* 0.097 0.085 0.212** 0.073 ‐0.057
[0.085] [0.081] [0.110] [0.106] [0.103] [0.102]
REPRESS ‐0.011 0.009 0.014 0.008 0.008 0.04
[0.023] [0.023] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.030]
BRITISH ‐0.299 ‐0.337 ‐0.427* ‐0.659*** ‐0.509* ‐0.836***
[0.208] [0.272] [0.242] [0.238] [0.291] [0.232]
FRENCH ‐0.066 ‐0.237 ‐0.063 ‐0.379* ‐0.389 ‐0.397*
[0.198] [0.260] [0.213] [0.224] [0.275] [0.217]
FUELS 0.151 0.241** ‐0.132 0.237** 0.349*** 0
[0.100] [0.101] [0.122] [0.118] [0.108] [0.139]
PRIMARY_MAT ‐0.064 ‐0.013 ‐0.195* ‐0.240* ‐0.067 ‐0.096
[0.078] [0.080] [0.109] [0.142] [0.105] [0.133]
Constant 1.323*** 1.358*** 0.59 2.458*** 1.708*** 1.195**
[0.419] [0.381] [0.452] [0.521] [0.405] [0.550]
Adj. Rsquared 0.3 0.28 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.31
Exogeneity of excl. instruments (p‐value) 0.65 0.6 0.54
Exogeneity of PRIVSHARE(‐1) (p‐value) 0.039 0.096 0.278
Underidentification (p‐value) 0.005 0.001 0.012
Obs. 1342 1178 1164 1102 992 983  
 
Notes on Table 3: Standard errors in parentheses are based on a robust covariance matrix that accounts for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within clusters. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 24 
 
percent.  All regressions include regional and time dummies whose coefficients are not displayed, but are 
available upon request.  Columns (4) – (6) are based on the GMM/TSLS estimation of a linear probability 
model. The instruments used in the regressions underlying columns (1) – (3) and (6) are CREDREG_3Y(-1), 
INFLA_3Y(-1) as well as GROWTH_3Y(-1). To test for the exogeneity of the excluded instruments, columns 
(4) – (6) refer to the p-value associated with Hansen’s (1982) J-statistic. The exogeneity of PRIVSHARE(-1) is 
tested using a C-(difference-in-Sargan) test in columns (4) – (6). The test for underidentification reported in 




( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Peg (De‐jure) Peg (LYS) Peg (RR) Peg (De‐jure) Peg (LYS) Peg (RR)
OLS OLS OLS GMM‐LPM GMM‐LPM GMM‐LPM
PRIVSHARE(‐1) 0.335 0.337 0.588** 2.326** 1.435* 2.118*
[0.210] [0.204] [0.236] [1.079] [0.859] [1.150]
FORLIAB(‐1) 0.007*** 0.038*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.037*** 0.010***
[0.002] [0.007] [0.002] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003]
BUDGET_3y(‐1) 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.015** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.016**
[0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
GAP_USA(‐1) 0.002 ‐0.005 ‐0.003 ‐0.016* ‐0.017** ‐0.018
[0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.012]
POPULATION ‐0.088*** ‐0.071*** ‐0.031 ‐0.181*** ‐0.116*** ‐0.104**
[0.026] [0.023] [0.035] [0.040] [0.030] [0.051]
KAOPEN(‐1) 0.003 0.028 0.082*** 0.027 0.051** 0.081***
[0.024] [0.022] [0.029] [0.029] [0.025] [0.028]
LANDLOCK 0.141** 0.108 0.082 0.215** 0.085 ‐0.022
[0.069] [0.066] [0.110] [0.098] [0.093] [0.100]
REPRESS ‐0.003 0.007 0.028 0.009 0.001 0.051**
[0.020] [0.021] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026]
BRITISH ‐0.261 ‐0.505 ‐0.510* ‐0.853*** ‐0.775** ‐1.075***
[0.256] [0.356] [0.286] [0.294] [0.390] [0.333]
FRENCH ‐0.1 ‐0.377 ‐0.186 ‐0.640** ‐0.633 ‐0.690**
[0.257] [0.352] [0.267] [0.290] [0.388] [0.335]
FUELS 0.09 0.204** ‐0.108 0.208 0.327*** 0.093
[0.104] [0.101] [0.127] [0.142] [0.121] [0.168]
PRIMARY_MAT ‐0.019 0.006 ‐0.212** ‐0.213* ‐0.066 ‐0.174
[0.066] [0.067] [0.096] [0.124] [0.101] [0.133]
Constant 1.799*** 1.937*** 0.716 2.949*** 2.281*** 1.769**
[0.442] [0.445] [0.512] [0.579] [0.545] [0.719]
Adj. Rsquared 0.36 0.3 0.3 0.18 0.24 0.23
Exogeneity of excl. instruments (p‐value) 0.31 0.34 0.81
Exogeneity of PRIVSHARE(‐1) (p‐value) 0.044 0.11 0.09
Underidentification (p‐value) 0.008 0.004 0.022
Obs. 1715 1491 1477 1376 1223 1215  
 
 
Notes on Table 4: Standard errors in parentheses are based on a robust covariance matrix that accounts for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within clusters. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 
percent.  All regressions include regional and time dummies whose coefficients are not displayed, but are 
available upon request.  Columns (4) – (6) are based on the GMM/TSLS estimation of a linear probability 
model. The instruments used in the regressions underlying columns (1) – (3) and (6) are CREDREG_3Y(-1), 
INFLA_3Y(-1) as well as GROWTH_3Y(-1). To test for the exogeneity of the excluded instruments, columns 
(4) – (6) refer to the p-value associated with Hansen’s (1982) J-statistic. The exogeneity of PRIVSHARE(-1) is 
tested using a C-(difference-in-Sargan) test in columns (4) – (6). The test for underidentification reported in 
columns (4) – (6) is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk-statistic. 25 
 
Table 5: Sample Variation ‐ Including Currency Crises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peg (De‐jure) Peg (LYS) Peg (RR) Peg (De‐jure) Peg (LYS) Peg (RR)
OLS OLS OLS GMM‐LPM GMM‐LPM GMM‐LPM
PRIVSHARE(‐1) 0.378* 0.263 0.536** 2.450** 1.110 1.934**
[0.192] [0.203] [0.219] [0.974] [0.739] [0.856]
FORLIAB(‐1) 0.008*** 0.027*** 0.006* 0.010*** 0.038*** 0.011***
[0.003] [0.010] [0.003] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002]
BUDGET_3y(‐1) 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.015** 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.014**
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
GAP_USA(‐1) 0.001 ‐0.004 ‐0.006 ‐0.014* ‐0.012** ‐0.017*
[0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.010]
POPULATION ‐0.073** ‐0.046 0.003 ‐0.178*** ‐0.115*** ‐0.103**
[0.029] [0.030] [0.038] [0.037] [0.026] [0.045]
KAOPEN(‐1) ‐0.001 0.027 0.076*** 0.024 0.036 0.073***
[0.022] [0.020] [0.025] [0.029] [0.024] [0.027]
LANDLOCK 0.135** 0.101* 0.109 0.187** 0.071 ‐0.034
[0.066] [0.060] [0.097] [0.091] [0.085] [0.089]
REPRESS 0.003 0.009 0.02 0.022 0.012 0.043*
[0.020] [0.019] [0.022] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024]
BRITISH ‐0.279 ‐0.332 ‐0.540** ‐0.581** ‐0.5 ‐0.750**
[0.196] [0.266] [0.227] [0.294] [0.312] [0.313]
FRENCH ‐0.088 ‐0.182 ‐0.11 ‐0.367 ‐0.357 ‐0.318
[0.195] [0.257] [0.196] [0.286] [0.300] [0.303]
FUELS 0.113 0.175* ‐0.09 0.212 0.282*** 0.068
[0.102] [0.099] [0.115] [0.135] [0.108] [0.133]
PRIMARY_MAT ‐0.003 0.028 ‐0.210** ‐0.185 ‐0.029 ‐0.163
[0.063] [0.064] [0.089] [0.117] [0.093] [0.126]
Constant 1.645*** 1.322*** 0.347 2.526*** 1.933*** 1.437***
[0.399] [0.392] [0.478] [0.441] [0.364] [0.538]
Adj. Rsquared 0.36 0.30 0.34 0.15 0.25 0.26
Exogeneity of excl. instruments (p‐value) 0.39 0.34 0.55
Exogeneity of PRIVSHARE(‐1) (p‐value) 0.017 0.146 0.04
Underidentification (p‐value) 0.003 0.001 0.01
Obs. 2017 1754 1745 1626 1434 1444  
 
 
Notes on Table 5: Standard errors in parentheses are based on a robust covariance matrix that accounts for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within clusters. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 
percent.  All regressions include regional and time dummies whose coefficients are not displayed, but are 
available upon request.  Columns (4) – (6) are based on the GMM/TSLS estimation of a linear probability 
model. The instruments used in the regressions underlying columns (1) – (3) and (6) are CREDREG_3Y(-1), 
INFLA_3Y(-1) as well as GROWTH_3Y(-1). To test for the exogeneity of the excluded instruments, columns 
(4) – (6) refer to the p-value associated with Hansen’s (1982) J-statistic. The exogeneity of PRIVSHARE(-1) is 
tested using a C-(difference-in-Sargan) test in columns (4) – (6). The test for underidentification reported in 
columns (4) – (6) is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk-statistic. 
 
 
 
 